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Introduction
In sociology social problems are a subject of inquiry and teaching. That subject is a central 
aspect of any sociology curriculum at a higher education institution (Best, 2011). However, 
there is not a single definition of what constitutes a social problem. And, what is perceived 
as a social problem or not is highly subjective; that is, one person’s social problem can be 
another person’s solution to a social problem. 
However, Dr. J.S. Mahoney of Virginia Commonwealth University (http://www.
people.vcu.edu/~jmahoney/define.htm) argues that there are widely agreed upon criteria 
for whether a social problem can be said to exist. These are:
1. The objective condition must be perceived to be a social problem publicly. That 
is, there must be some public outcry. People must become actively involved in 
discussing the problem. Public attention becomes directed toward that social 
condition. 
2. The condition must involve a gap between social ideals and social reality.
3. A significant proportion of the population must be involved in defining the 
problem. A large proportion of the population must be concerned about the 
condition—it must have national attention. 
4. The condition must be capable of solution through collective action by people. If 
no solution is perceived to be possible, people will resign themselves to their fate.
From this perspective, the development and commercialization of agricultural bio-
technologies (GM crops), or more specifically transgenic crops with herbicide tolerance 
or insect resistance traits, can be viewed as a social problem. I am not arguing these tech-
nologies are the cause of problems in society; rather, my point is that the intense debates 
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and campaigns in favor of or in opposition to these technologies rise to the definition of 
social problem a la Mahoney above. 
It is inarguable that there is a lot of public attention on GM crops, whether the 
attention is favorable or not. Ballot initiatives to label GM crops have taken place in 
several states, including Hawaii, California, Oregon, Colorado, Vermont, and other 
northeastern states ((http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/issues/976/ge-food-labeling/
state-labeling-initiatives#). In addition, the geographic spread and numbers of people 
and amounts of money being spent on the initiatives, for and against, mean that con-
ditions 3 and 4 are satisfied: the scope is national, and collective action is seen as a 
solution one way or another. Condition 2 is met because GM crop proponents see the 
technologies as largely beneficial to society, and opposition to them baffling or based 
in scientific illiteracy (Evenson, 2006; Faivre, 2015). Opponents, on the other hand, 
view the advent and deployment of the technologies as a highly controversial scheme 
to restructure the food supply for profit with dubious benefits, or even dangers, for 
society (e.g., Smith, 2003).
For these reasons, in this paper I will argue that GM crops can be viewed as presenting a 
potentially intractable social problem. Specifically, I hypothesize that 
The development path of the agricultural biotechnology industry, including the 
novelty of the technologies, has resulted in rapid deployment and adoption, while 
at the same time created a strong resistance movement.
That is, the very crop traits, industry structure, and regulatory approval process that have 
facilitated extremely rapid and extensive adoption have also created social and economic 
conditions and product characteristics that have engendered unease among consumers 
and others. This unease has proven to be exploitable by anti-GM groups attempting to 
develop negative images of the industry and the technologies. 
To support this hypothesis, I first review the relevant court decisions that allowed and 
encouraged the use of utility patents in agriculture—an economic sector in which they 
had not been used extensively. Then I discuss the ramifications of the resulting structure 
of the life science industry, wherein the seed sector was integrated with the agricultural 
chemical sector. After this I argue that it might have been a strategic error on the part of 
the biotechnology industry to initiate commercialization with transgenic crops in which 
novel genes are introduced across species lines. This is followed by a review of the regula-
tory theories or frameworks of “Substantial Equivalence” and “Generally Recognized as 
Safe” (G.R.A.S.) that have governed the federal government approval process. Finally, a 
discussion of how opponents and proponents frame debates over GM crops and a discus-
sion of several possible outcomes are presented.
Court Decisions and Intellectual Property Regimes
Ananda Mohan Chakrabarty, a molecular scientist working for General Electric, 
requested a patent on a bacterium that was designed using molecular techniques to dis-
solve crude oil and was intended to treat oil spills. His request was rejected by a patent 
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examiner, because living organisms were not legally defined as patentable materials. 
Chakrabarty appealed to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, but it agreed 
with the original decision. 
Chakrabarty then appealed to the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 
and it ruled in favor of his position. The appeals court held that living organisms were 
like any other invention. Sidney A. Diamond, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, 
appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court case was argued on March 17, 1980, 
and decided on June 16, 1980. In a 5-4 ruling, the court ruled in favor of Chakrabarty 
and upheld the patent, holding that:
A live, human-made micro-organism is patentable subject matter under [Title 
35 U.S.C.] 101. Respondent’s micro-organism constitutes a “manufacture” 
or “composition of matter” within that statute.
The majority focused on language in the original patent act that seemed to provide 
extremely wide coverage. In addition, as late as 1952 Congress had confirmed this in-
terpretation by decreeing that patents could be granted for “anything under the sun” 
(Jasanoff, 2008; Welsh, 2009a). 
The minority argued in its dissent that Congress had specifically taken up this issue 
through the establishment of the Plant Patent Act of 1930 and the Plant Variety Protec-
tion Act of 1970. If the original patent act had covered living organisms, then Congress 
would not have been required to enact separate legislation for agricultural innovations 
such as improved crop varieties. Critics of the majority’s opinion argued that the court 
would have been on firmer legal ground if it had decided that the human invention had 
changed in such a way that Thomas Jefferson’s original notion of intellectual property 
and patentable matter was out of date (Jasanoff, 2008; Welsh, 2009a).
In any case, the decision held that a genetically altered microorganism can be patented. 
Though there was relevant earlier case law regarding plants, bacteria, etc., prior to Dia-
mond, the general interpretation was that altered natural organisms that were no longer 
living could be patented (Pease, 2004 [1989]). This decision, and the subsequent J.E.M. 
Ag Supply versus Pioneer HI-Bred, gave plant patent applicants the option of seeking 
utility patents under 35 U.S.C. § 101 to protect a novel variety. J.E.M. Ag Supply versus 
Pioneer HI-Bred clarified things by holding that the earlier Plant Patent Act of 1930 and 
the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 did not preclude patenting of seeds and plants 
(Pease, 2004).
The decisions increased the incentive to research, develop, and commercialize bio-
technologies, including agricultural ones. They provided a huge boost to the agricultural 
biotechnology industry, as firms could protect their inventions or intellectual property 
with patents. This is because utility patents offer broader protection than the Plant Patent 
Act of 1930 and the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970. The Plant Patent Act applies 
only to asexually reproduced and non-tuber-propagated plants; and the Plant Variety 
Protection Act allows a farmer privilege (farmers can save and replant seeds) and a broader 
research exemption than exists currently (Glenna et al., 2015; Pease, 2004).
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Commercial Impacts and Industry Structure
The court decisions noted above were extremely critical building blocks for the bio-
technology or life science industry. I argue they made possible the current development 
trajectory of the biotechnology industry and its tremendous impacts in the agricultural 
sector. Specifically, patenting provided sufficient protection for agricultural chemical 
firms to finance a shift to a life science orientation—essentially, a shift to an integrated 
pesticide and seed sector. Chemical firms purchased seed companies to use seed intellectual 
property as the vehicle for delivering transgenic technology in agriculture (Ervin et al., 
2000). This shifted the seed industry from dispersed ownership, with lots of small firms, 
to more concentrated ownership, with a few firms controlling the industry.
Indeed, St. Louis–based Monsanto Co. was not a seed firm until after the Supreme 
Court decision and now is the world’s largest seed firm. And the chemical firm DuPont 
purchased the largest seed firm Pioneer HI-Bred. The concentration ratio of the top 
four firms in the newly formed seed industry is over 60%, with Monsanto controlling 
over 25% (http://www.etcgroup.org/putting_the_cartel_before_the_horse_2013; see 
Table 1). A top-four ratio of 40% and one firm controlling 25% are generally consid-
ered to define a concentrated sector. The concentration in the biotechnology industry, 
combined with the seed and pesticide industries merging to a large extent, has had a 
number of important ramifications. It has made the biotech industry a target for critics 
such as the ETC Group, which points out its cartel-like nature. Farmers are said to be 
at a disadvantage, especially given the use of utility patents in place of the less restrictive 
intellectual property regimes used historically in agriculture (http://www.etcgroup.org/
putting_the_cartel_before_the_horse_2013). 
Others have pointed to the potential to increase herbicide (especially glyphosate) use in 
agriculture through the commercialization of herbicide-tolerant crops. And concerns have 
been raised regarding environmental risks from development of resistance to glyphosate 
and the soil bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis, engineered into corn, soybean, and cotton, 
because of the very large acreages on which the new technologies have been planted 
(Ervin & Welsh, 2006).
TABLE 1: Concentration in the Seed Industry, 2013
   Rank Company Seed Sales % Market
  ($US mil) Share
   1 Monsanto 8,953 26.0
   2 DuPont Pioneer 6,261 18.2
   3 Syngenta (Switzerland) 3,185 9.2
   4 Vilmorin (France) (Groupe Limagrain) 1,670 4.8
 Total (CR4)  60.2
Source: ETC Group.
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Novel Technologies and Permissive Biosafety Regulation
In addition to industry structural arrangements, the nature of the technologies themselves 
combined with the regulatory theories employed to review them prior to commercializa-
tion have created opportunities for critics of GM crops. 
A transgene is genetic material (DNA) that is inserted via gene splicing techniques across 
species lines into the genome of a host organism’s cell. And a transgenic agronomic crop 
is one containing novel DNA 
derived from an organism other 
than the parental seeds or in 
addition to the parental genetic 
material. The foreign DNA is in-
corporated early in development 
and is inherited by offspring in 
Mendelian fashion (Ervin et 
al., 2000; Kindt et al., 2015). 
Conventional breeding methods 
did not attempt to move genetic 
material across species lines. For 
example, using conventional plant breeding methods it is not possible to insert a soil 
bacterium into a crop plant such that it is manifest through the plant parts. Therefore, 
transgenic crops are novel technologies and likely to be of interest to consumers and oth-
ers. This remains true for now at least, despite the recent finding by Kindt and colleagues 
(2015) that horizontal gene transfer of agrobacterium DNA has occurred without direct 
human intervention in sweet potatoes and probably other agronomically important crops. 
However, we were familiar with this mechanism previously, since we used it to deliver 
insect resistance and/or herbicide tolerance traits to soybean, corn, cotton, and canola.
Indeed, there are other techniques to engineer crop varieties to manifest novel and 
potentially useful traits that are closer to conventional methods (Ervin & Welsh, 2006; 
Nielsen, 2003). For example, cisgenic (also intragenic) techniques might have been a 
more strategic approach. Cisgenesis refers to organisms that have been engineered using a 
process in which genes are artificially transferred between organisms that could otherwise 
be conventionally bred. Unlike in transgenesis, genes are only transferred between closely 
related organisms. A few food products engineered through cisgenic techniques are in 
the early stages of commercialization. And some preliminary studies look at consumer 
attitudes toward cisgenic crop products (Delwaide et al., 2015; also see Nielsen, 2003, 
for a discussion of types of transformations).
The reaction of consumers and groups that have been active in opposition to GM/
transgenic crops to cisgenic crops will be interesting to see. It may be more difficult to 
mount campaigns based on the strangeness and novelty of the technology if it involves 
closely related organisms. In addition, if the findings by Kindt and colleagues (2015) are 
replicated widely and gain traction, it may become more difficult to campaign against 
transgenic crops.
     
Figure 1: Greenpeace anti-GMO
ad and a pro-GMO ad.
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However, it is clear that opposition groups have been very successful to date in exploiting 
the novelty of transgenic techniques to push consumers away from GM crop products 
(www.greenpeaceusa.org/; see Figure 1). 
One reason is that critics see the US principles of substantial equivalence and generally 
recognized as safe as inadequate to regulate the novel technologies. Substantial equivalence 
means that if GE food is characterized as substantially equivalent to its “natural” ante-
cedent, it can be assumed to pose no new health risk; GM crops are mostly the same as 
conventional crops, so they are treated this way by the regulatory process (Welsh, 2009b). 
In addition, under G.R.A.S. protocols, if a substance is generally recognized as safe under 
conditions of its intended use among qualified experts, it is not subject to premarket 
review as a food additive by the FDA, which would trigger more exacting safety testing 
(see http://www.fda.gov/Food/IngredientsPackagingLabeling/GRAS/default.htm). So 
for example, since Bt is used as a foliar spray in organic agriculture and is considered to 
have low mammalian toxicity, it is considered safe if engineered into corn and manifested 
through parts of the plant. That is, Bt is generally recognized as safe whether a foliar spray 
or a transgene. I argue that the perceived novelty of the GM/transgenic crops to date, 
combined with the use of non-novel regulatory regimes, provide rhetorical raw material 
to anti-GM groups.
Rapid Adoption and Resulting Push-Back
The commercialization of transgenic crops has resulted in rapid adoption globally (http://
www.isaaa.org/). This is a result of the resources concentrated in the life science sector and 
the global reach of the firms in it as well as the popularity of transgenically derived traits 
among farmers.  In addition, the restrictive patent protections and permissive regulatory 
environment have incentivized firms to move the required technologies forward and invest 
heavily in their success. However, I argue that these same conditions and circumstances 
have also created an increasingly successful backlash and resistance movement against 
the technologies. This is due in part to the ability of anti-GMO groups to cast in a nega-
tive light both the new technologies and IP regimes and the transformed seed industry’s 
resulting concentration and integration with the pesticide industry. In addition, these 
same groups have been somewhat successful in painting the regulatory regimes employed 
as ineffective and as catering to the life science firms (e.g., Smith, 2003). 
However, I also argue that the development path and commercialization strategy of the 
firms in the life science sector prevent meaningful and rigorous public debate and input. 
Environmental and other groups and individuals believe themselves to be frozen out of 
the process and do not trust the major players in the life science sector because, at least in 
part, of their involvement in the pesticide industry—a frequent target of environmental 
groups. For example, in the Chakrabarty v Diamond decision the dissent focused on the 
lack of provision for Congress to weigh in on such an important policy decision with 
far-reaching economic and social implications (Jasanoff, 2008; Welsh, 2009a).
Faced with these circumstances, groups suspicious of the new technologies began 
campaigns against them. Anti-biotech groups employed provocative symbols to turn 
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consumers away from the technologies (see Figure 1). Such campaigns are not peculiar 
to anti-GMO groups. In fact, they have become a common method of influencing policy 
when access to formal institutions such as Congress, the executive branch, and the courts 
are not available or have proven ineffective (Rosenbaum, 2013).
As discussed earlier, the campaigns have been successful in creating support among the 
general public for labeling GMO ingredients and have resulted in some state-level policies 
supported by anti-GMO groups and opposed by industry (http://www.centerforfood-
safety.org/issues/976/ge-food-labeling/state-labeling-initiatives#). In addition, industry 
has responded with its own public relations campaigns and attempts to pass legislation 
at the federal level to undercut state labeling laws (http://coalitionforsafeaffordablefood.
org/). Each side in the debate attempts to convince policy makers and, especially, food 
consumers of the legitimacy of their arguments and the poverty of the opponents’ argu-
ments. In sociology, this type of social action is called “framing.”
Framing is an action-oriented set of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimize 
activities and campaigns (Clapp & Fuchs, 2009). Anti-biotech groups have a shared 
frame. Their frame emphasizes lack of data on the safety of consuming GM foods, lack 
of sufficient regulations from the EPA, FDA, and USDA, and biodiversity loss due to 
negative impacts on non-target plants and animals (Welsh & Ervin, 2006). 
Life science firms and most scientists and policy makers also have a shared frame for 
agricultural biotechnology. This frame emphasizes increased food security and environ-
mental sustainability, less pesticide use, higher yields, and increased nutritional intake 
(http://coalitionforsafeaffordablefood.org/; and see Figure 1).
The result is a polarized dialogue, especially in the United States. What is needed is 
greater social consensus around technological change in the food and agricultural sector 
(Welsh & Ervin, 2006). This consensus will probably not be obtained through the cur-
rent conflicting strategies of industry and anti-GMO groups.
Discussion and Conclusions
The development path and commercialization strategy followed by the life science industry 
was economically rational and very effective, resulting in rapid commercialization and 
adoption by farmers in the US and elsewhere (isaaa.org/). At the same time, the structure 
of the emergent life science industry and the perceived novelty of its technologies and 
IP regimes, coupled with a permissive regulatory theory, created the conditions for an 
effective anti-GM food campaign. At this point the outcome is unclear. If GM foods 
are labeled, will consumers listen to anti-GM rhetoric and turn away from them? If this 
occurs, GM technology might become largely irrelevant. However, it is also possible 
that that most consumers will focus on price and product quality and not on traits such 
as genetic modification. If this is the case, then consumers wary of GM foods will drive 
the demand for organic and other non-GM food, and the dominant issue will become 
coexistence. Can we develop policies and a reliable infrastructure whereby GM foods and 
non-GM foods can serve their respective constituencies?
Another approach would be to engage in meaningful dialogue around the salient issues. 
For example, industry might consider acquiescing and reverting to more traditional forms 
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of IP protection, such as Plant Variety Protection Certificates (see Ervin et al., 2000). In 
addition, to bolster public confidence and allay concerns, GM crops, at least in the short 
term, could be regulated under a food additive regime (http://www.fda.gov/Food/Ingre-
dientsPackagingLabeling/GRAS/default.htm). This would trigger additional food safety 
testing, which would raise costs but might produce longer-term sustainable economic and 
social benefits. These types of suggestions may appear to be far-fetched or nonstarters. 
However, given the effectiveness to date of anti-GM food groups in influencing public 
opinion, it could be time for industry to try a different strategy than PR campaigns and 
flexing its legislative and policy muscles.
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